Comments on: The Day DoD KM Died http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/ with John Bordeaux Sun, 11 Dec 2011 02:00:37 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=4446 hourly 1 By: William (Mark) Jones http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-83317 William (Mark) Jones Mon, 28 Nov 2011 06:26:05 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-83317 This was an enlightening article. While I appreciate and applaud the efforts of grass roots movements to make things better, there is a place for knowledge managers. I have been working as the KMO for Regional Command Southwest in Afghanistan. Since I have been here, I have heard a hundred competing definitions for knowledge management. I have also seen several distinct approaches to it. I view most of them as doomed to failure because they are not attempting to provide value added to the warfighter. Operationalizing knowledge management gives it relevance. I will provide an example. At RC (SW), I began by reading all of the documents which provided direction and Commander's intent. These included OPORDs, CONOPs, FRAGOs, etc. It was a long list and took a couple of weeks just to read. I also went to the various Battle Rhythm events to better understand how what was being discussed and in what forums. With that information, I was able to create a comprehensive evaluation of RC (SW)'s Battle Rhythm. The report highlighted discrepancies between our stated goals and our curent efforts. It was used by the Chief of Staff to help refocus the meetings toward our stated objectives. This is one example of many I could provide on the issue. Operationalized knowledge management can be a force for good within DoD. This was an enlightening article. While I appreciate and applaud the efforts of grass roots movements to make things better, there is a place for knowledge managers.

I have been working as the KMO for Regional Command Southwest in Afghanistan. Since I have been here, I have heard a hundred competing definitions for knowledge management. I have also seen several distinct approaches to it. I view most of them as doomed to failure because they are not attempting to provide value added to the warfighter.

Operationalizing knowledge management gives it relevance. I will provide an example. At RC (SW), I began by reading all of the documents which provided direction and Commander’s intent. These included OPORDs, CONOPs, FRAGOs, etc. It was a long list and took a couple of weeks just to read. I also went to the various Battle Rhythm events to better understand how what was being discussed and in what forums. With that information, I was able to create a comprehensive evaluation of RC (SW)’s Battle Rhythm. The report highlighted discrepancies between our stated goals and our curent efforts. It was used by the Chief of Staff to help refocus the meetings toward our stated objectives.

This is one example of many I could provide on the issue. Operationalized knowledge management can be a force for good within DoD.

]]> By: PaL http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-61587 PaL Sun, 21 Aug 2011 21:18:27 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-61587 Within our AF organization, the AFKN Community of Practice (CoP) was a VERY important tool for interacting with our global counterparts. As the focus of our CoP was collaboration on training issues and a location to share resources, the 'death' was a significant blow to the collective effort of our programs. As with MANY other support programs and communities in the DOD (AF particularly), too often the individuals making decisions have only 'academic' experience or these are ‘grey beards’ with outdated concepts and ineffective methods of application to our modern organizations. The Air Force’s Training community has for a long time lacked tools for sharing best practices, knowledge and experience. It has been my experience and impression over 20 years in the AFS that either the ‘collective’ AF community undervalues the need for a robust and experienced Training Management community or the AFS has lacked the leadership to implement policies, clear guidance and the tools needed within the community for effectively management. In light of this, for those of us actively involved in various AF Training CoPs, the grassroots CoP model allowed professional at the MAJCOM, Wing, Unit and work center levels a tool for cross-organizational/hierarchy collaboration, communication and sharing. My analogy of AFKN is that of being within a University Library, free to share tools, collaborate together as well as passing along best practice ideas, without the need to interact or depend on the Librarian’s in charge. The cancellation of AFKN felt as though the Librarian’s discovered they had lost control of the conversation and rush to turn the library light off. Those of us that understood the potentials of this in our professional communities, we still know the answers are out there, however, now it’s nearly impossible to find those answers in the dark… thus, control of the conversation has been restored. I recall my previous O-6 Commander once told me, ‘the military is really just a friendly dictatorship, and not always so friendly’. Within our AF organization, the AFKN Community of Practice (CoP) was a VERY important tool for interacting with our global counterparts. As the focus of our CoP was collaboration on training issues and a location to share resources, the ‘death’ was a significant blow to the collective effort of our programs. As with MANY other support programs and communities in the DOD (AF particularly), too often the individuals making decisions have only ‘academic’ experience or these are ‘grey beards’ with outdated concepts and ineffective methods of application to our modern organizations. The Air Force’s Training community has for a long time lacked tools for sharing best practices, knowledge and experience. It has been my experience and impression over 20 years in the AFS that either the ‘collective’ AF community undervalues the need for a robust and experienced Training Management community or the AFS has lacked the leadership to implement policies, clear guidance and the tools needed within the community for effectively management. In light of this, for those of us actively involved in various AF Training CoPs, the grassroots CoP model allowed professional at the MAJCOM, Wing, Unit and work center levels a tool for cross-organizational/hierarchy collaboration, communication and sharing. My analogy of AFKN is that of being within a University Library, free to share tools, collaborate together as well as passing along best practice ideas, without the need to interact or depend on the Librarian’s in charge. The cancellation of AFKN felt as though the Librarian’s discovered they had lost control of the conversation and rush to turn the library light off. Those of us that understood the potentials of this in our professional communities, we still know the answers are out there, however, now it’s nearly impossible to find those answers in the dark… thus, control of the conversation has been restored. I recall my previous O-6 Commander once told me, ‘the military is really just a friendly dictatorship, and not always so friendly’.

]]> By: Shawn http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-40859 Shawn Wed, 20 Apr 2011 22:05:57 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-40859 People will talk with each other to get the information they need regardless of channel or technology so the need should be focused on listening to what conversations are out there that support the military mission such as in "companycommand" rather than creating endless empty forums and forcing people to go there. People will talk with each other to get the information they need regardless of channel or technology so the need should be focused on listening to what conversations are out there that support the military mission such as in “companycommand” rather than creating endless empty forums and forcing people to go there.

]]> By: Shawn Bradford http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-9407 Shawn Bradford Wed, 10 Feb 2010 16:59:37 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-9407 An excerpt from the book, "Transparency: How Leaders Create a Culture of Candor" - I implore these KM Leaders to hear our collective KM Worker voices... "Then do not have one mind, and one alone That only your opinion can be right. Whoever thinks that he alone is wise, His eloquence, his mind, above the rest, come the unfolding, shows his emptiness. A man, though wise, should never be ashamed Of learning more, and must unbend his mind. Have you not seen the trees beside the torrent, The ones that bend them saving every leaf, While the resistant perish root and branch? And so the ship that will not clacken sail, the sheet drawn tight, unyeilding, overturns, She ends the voyage with keel on top. No, yeild your wrath, allow a change of stand. Young as I am, if I may give advice, I'l say it would be best if men were born Perfect in wisdom, but failing this (which often fails) it can be no dishonor To learn from others when they speak good sense. Sophocles' "Antigone" An excerpt from the book, “Transparency: How Leaders Create a Culture of Candor” – I implore these KM Leaders to hear our collective KM Worker voices…

“Then do not have one mind, and one alone
That only your opinion can be right.
Whoever thinks that he alone is wise,
His eloquence, his mind, above the rest,
come the unfolding, shows his emptiness.
A man, though wise, should never be ashamed
Of learning more, and must unbend his mind.
Have you not seen the trees beside the torrent,
The ones that bend them saving every leaf,
While the resistant perish root and branch?
And so the ship that will not clacken sail, the sheet drawn tight, unyeilding, overturns,
She ends the voyage with keel on top.
No, yeild your wrath, allow a change of stand.
Young as I am, if I may give advice,
I’l say it would be best if men were born
Perfect in wisdom, but failing this
(which often fails) it can be no dishonor
To learn from others when they speak good sense.
Sophocles’ “Antigone”

]]> By: Josh Rosenthal http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-2979 Josh Rosenthal Thu, 11 Jun 2009 14:45:12 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-2979 Successful knowledge-sharing most often emerges out of need and evolves into informal organization of professionals who's basic survival (success) requires real-time actionable information. From the outside looking in I am struck by the lack of innovative and entrepreneurial insight of the formal organization and the power of same across small knowledge sharing communities. IF only DoD could provide the pipe, the infostructure to support such creative efforts. Combining the best of social networks approaches and information discovery applications provides a cost-effective transformative, flexible and successful organization. As sad as DoD looks regarding KM, there are way too many examples in large industry as well. It was once said that those who hold knowledge (information) hold power. There is a paradigm shift. Shared knowledge is infinitely more powerful and required for success and ultimately survivability. Successful knowledge-sharing most often emerges out of need and evolves into informal organization of professionals who’s basic survival (success) requires real-time actionable information. From the outside looking in I am struck by the lack of innovative and entrepreneurial insight of the formal organization and the power of same across small knowledge sharing communities. IF only DoD could provide the pipe, the infostructure to support such creative efforts. Combining the best of social networks approaches and information discovery applications provides a cost-effective transformative, flexible and successful organization.
As sad as DoD looks regarding KM, there are way too many examples in large industry as well. It was once said that those who hold knowledge (information) hold power. There is a paradigm shift. Shared knowledge is infinitely more powerful and required for success and ultimately survivability.

]]> By: John http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-2945 John Tue, 09 Jun 2009 14:31:30 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-2945 Tim, Excellent comment, thank you! You've hit on the core message - had I taken a more gentle route to the conversation, it would have been the lead. These folks in the Beltway believe that in order to "advance" KM, you do need central funding, attention, human capital strategies, etc. Meanwhile, the heroes in the field are using KM principles and methods to make a difference. The perspective in the field is framed by the need to accomplish a Divisional or Unit mission - the perspective in the Beltway appears to be to advance KM in order to address "all" missions. It is this focus on what is a process step that represents the greatest problem for me. This is how we ended up with a Capability Maturity Model for software that is somewhat irrelevant to how software methods have evolved. Do you "advance" KM by strengthening the core, or by enabling connections across nodes? Or do you need to strengthen the core in order to enable these connections? These are questions of theory, but I am accused of (among other sins) excessive excursions into theory. After all, the KM people here "know" what will work, they just need to get their Program or Center funded. Tim,
Excellent comment, thank you! You’ve hit on the core message – had I taken a more gentle route to the conversation, it would have been the lead. These folks in the Beltway believe that in order to “advance” KM, you do need central funding, attention, human capital strategies, etc. Meanwhile, the heroes in the field are using KM principles and methods to make a difference. The perspective in the field is framed by the need to accomplish a Divisional or Unit mission – the perspective in the Beltway appears to be to advance KM in order to address “all” missions. It is this focus on what is a process step that represents the greatest problem for me. This is how we ended up with a Capability Maturity Model for software that is somewhat irrelevant to how software methods have evolved.
Do you “advance” KM by strengthening the core, or by enabling connections across nodes? Or do you need to strengthen the core in order to enable these connections?
These are questions of theory, but I am accused of (among other sins) excessive excursions into theory. After all, the KM people here “know” what will work, they just need to get their Program or Center funded.

]]> By: Tim Snyder http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-2835 Tim Snyder Tue, 02 Jun 2009 22:46:50 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-2835 I was also at that conference and attended the invite only meeting. While I agree with most of what you are saying, I was neither surprised nor disheartened by what I heard, nor do I believe that KM is dead within DoD. KM is alive and well within DoD and as with any really valuable endeavor in the military, it happens with or without top level support. I have been working in the KM field for 3 years with Navy Strike Groups, and KM continues to prove its value, with increasingly higher level support for resource allocation – note the opening remarks at the Pacific Fleet KM Conference by the Pacific Fleet Commander http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=45762. The “so what” of KM is being proven every day in the fleet. Would it be more effective with support from the beltway? Maybe… Look at what happened to KM in industry in the 90’s, and they had plenty of leadership buy-in! Successful revolutions start with efforts at the grass roots of an organization. In each of the branches of DoD there are KM thought leaders and KM practitioners that are at the vanguard in the battle for resources, and they are winning that battle because they are proving the value of KM day in and day out. Tim Snyder Knowledge Manager Tactical Training Group, Pacific I was also at that conference and attended the invite only meeting. While I agree with most of what you are saying, I was neither surprised nor disheartened by what I heard, nor do I believe that KM is dead within DoD. KM is alive and well within DoD and as with any really valuable endeavor in the military, it happens with or without top level support.

I have been working in the KM field for 3 years with Navy Strike Groups, and KM continues to prove its value, with increasingly higher level support for resource allocation – note the opening remarks at the Pacific Fleet KM Conference by the Pacific Fleet Commander http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=45762. The “so what” of KM is being proven every day in the fleet. Would it be more effective with support from the beltway? Maybe… Look at what happened to KM in industry in the 90’s, and they had plenty of leadership buy-in! Successful revolutions start with efforts at the grass roots of an organization. In each of the branches of DoD there are KM thought leaders and KM practitioners that are at the vanguard in the battle for resources, and they are winning that battle because they are proving the value of KM day in and day out.

Tim Snyder
Knowledge Manager
Tactical Training Group, Pacific

]]> By: Abigail Howe http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-2177 Abigail Howe Sun, 17 May 2009 04:16:42 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-2177 Your posts has highlighted the need for a multi-pronged approach. As I have been viewing the KM discussion from a distance (through friends in USAF), I acknowledge that there is a large learning curve for some senior individuals. Part of the discussion needs to be the applicability of new technology. There is a dynamic evolution of social media, as well as KM which will no doubt be codified in the new Cyber command structure. However, there are a few things that you mentioned that need to addressed throughout the DoD, where diverse requirements and levels of 'openness' for each separate services (ie. Joint, USAF, USA, USAR and ARNG) will require both command structure and emphasis, as well as openness for operators. Numerous hurdles exist in the process of creating unified metrics and performance expectations, including the variation within operating environments, risk definition and SW application requirements. Each of thes core challenges will require collaboration at all levels of DoD for KM and IM in different working environments (ie. tactical WIFI, Shipboard, Strategic sattelite, FBCB2) to be successful. Furthermore, the core of changing warfare and global landscapse dictate that cross-functional requirements be available for ALL MOS and Services and ranks (ie. reference expanded tactical experience and training required for new USAF lieutenants that are NOW leading supply convoys) . Your posts has highlighted the need for a multi-pronged approach. As I have been viewing the KM discussion from a distance (through friends in USAF), I acknowledge that there is a large learning curve for some senior individuals. Part of the discussion needs to be the applicability of new technology. There is a dynamic evolution of social media, as well as KM which will no doubt be codified in the new Cyber command structure. However, there are a few things that you mentioned that need to addressed throughout the DoD, where diverse requirements and levels of ‘openness’ for each separate services (ie. Joint, USAF, USA, USAR and ARNG) will require both command structure and emphasis, as well as openness for operators. Numerous hurdles exist in the process of creating unified metrics and performance expectations, including the variation within operating environments, risk definition and SW application requirements. Each of thes core challenges will require collaboration at all levels of DoD for KM and IM in different working environments (ie. tactical WIFI, Shipboard, Strategic sattelite, FBCB2) to be successful. Furthermore, the core of changing warfare and global landscapse dictate that cross-functional requirements be available for ALL MOS and Services and ranks (ie. reference expanded tactical experience and training required for new USAF lieutenants that are NOW leading supply convoys) .

]]> By: Dave McDonald http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-2165 Dave McDonald Sat, 16 May 2009 21:19:06 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-2165 Interesting premise John. I'm happy to report, however, that fluid, transparent, evolutionary and "always improving" KM in DoD, IC and the extended national security community is neither dead nor particularly threatened by a room full of "fuddy-duddies" (from Lewis' comment) at the top of the heirarchy. If one needs to get a sense for the groundswell of new methods, tools and cultural shifts happening in nooks and crannies of the USG, one most certainly needs to get out of the Capitol Beltway Region (where I presume your meeting took place). The continuing march to modern, net-centric, socially-netted, organic and dynamic collaboration is happening without much help from the policy-makers and top-level resource or acquisition decision-makers. Many of them are perfectly happy to ride the wave of success, however, so that helps in some cases in keeping them out of the way. Urge you to take some road trips and use your contacts and considerable following to get inside at the grassroots working levels across USG -- what you will see will give you a much better perspective, and perhaps you will then have occasion to write another blog about it. This glass is WAY more than half full. All the best and Aloha, Dave Interesting premise John. I’m happy to report, however, that fluid, transparent, evolutionary and “always improving” KM in DoD, IC and the extended national security community is neither dead nor particularly threatened by a room full of “fuddy-duddies” (from Lewis’ comment) at the top of the heirarchy. If one needs to get a sense for the groundswell of new methods, tools and cultural shifts happening in nooks and crannies of the USG, one most certainly needs to get out of the Capitol Beltway Region (where I presume your meeting took place). The continuing march to modern, net-centric, socially-netted, organic and dynamic collaboration is happening without much help from the policy-makers and top-level resource or acquisition decision-makers. Many of them are perfectly happy to ride the wave of success, however, so that helps in some cases in keeping them out of the way. Urge you to take some road trips and use your contacts and considerable following to get inside at the grassroots working levels across USG — what you will see will give you a much better perspective, and perhaps you will then have occasion to write another blog about it. This glass is WAY more than half full. All the best and Aloha, Dave

]]> By: Standing on the Toes of Giants http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/comment-page-1/#comment-2122 Standing on the Toes of Giants Fri, 15 May 2009 22:08:55 +0000 http://jbordeaux.com/the-day-dod-km-died/#comment-2122 [...] recent reference to the death of Knowledge Management (KM) in the Defense Department appears to have sparked some reaction - most of it aimed at this [...] [...] recent reference to the death of Knowledge Management (KM) in the Defense Department appears to have sparked some reaction – most of it aimed at this [...]

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