But the January ODNI report you quote has not been approved for public release and was not provided to GPO. The link you cited goes to the 1997 report of the Moynihan Commission. The January ODNI report is here (pdf).

Anyway, the underlying point you make is important. Classification guides are the “software” of the classification system, and if there is to be reform of classification policy (including the improved public access to govt information that I am concerned about) it will have to occur in the guides. Right now, there is not only a lack of uniformity and consistency, but a general lack of quality control. Many classification guides have not been reviewed and updated for years.

It remains to be seen, though, whether uniformity is the solution. (The guides could end up being uniformly bad.) For now, the ODNI/SSC has not yet proven the idea can work even within the IC with a community-wide classification guide. So talk of a government-wide classification guide seems premature.

To conclude on a positive note, I was impressed by the PNSR emphasis on pilot projects and small-scale experiments in innovation. I think this is essential.

However, the PNSR report speaks to BOTH security clearances and security classification as areas in need of reform. I don’t think we misused terms, but perhaps could have been clearer – I’m sorry to give the impression that I confused the issue in my prior comment.

As for a single classification system, it all depends on what you mean by the word “system.” Yes, we have a single POLICY. However, in practice, it is a fragmented and unevenly applied policy that results in a system that lacks unity.

A January ODNI report (a copy can be found on the FAS website, but the GPO link is http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/03sum.pdf) said this: “The team found that the reviewed classification guides often provided little insight into the reasons for setting classification and limited guidance for discriminating between classification levels. Most of the guides were agency- or program-specific.”

***Please note the above sentence, the system is fragmented in practice because agencies and programs write their own guidance.***

“In situations where users perceived conflicting guidance, they found it difficult to discern which classification guide or level should take precedence, leading to over-classification in many cases.”

Our solution, again, to what ails classification policy AND PRACTICE, is embodied in our recommendation that the ODNI SSC be given teeth (and whatever other body parts will help them succeed). In practice, the system does not behave as a single system – this was true across PNSR findings. The noble intent of many laws and EOs nevertheless failed to ensure coherent behavior across the national security system.

The PNSR report commits an avoidable error and generates unnecessary confusion by, forgive me, misusing the term “classification system.” Classification refers to the identification and designation of national security information (as confidential, secret or top secret). PNSR uses the term as if it also included personnel security, which deals with the process of adjudicating approval for access to classified information. Personnel security policy is indeed fragmented and inconsistent, as you say– but that is not a problem of classification policy per se.

The language you cite from executive order 13467 (not 13267) likewise deals with personnel security, not with classification. The very same order states that classified information is defined by executive order 12958, as amended.

I have no disagreement with the PNSR recommendations concerning personnel security policy. But as I wrote, they do not provide a solution to what ails classification policy.

The lack of clarity is my fault entirely, and I so stipulate. However, my team did review the EOs – which fall short of success because they don’t address fundamental issues.

For example, regarding security clearances: EO 13267 says, in part, “approval to establish additional requirements shall be limited to circumstances where additional requirements are necessary to address significant needs unique to the agency involved or to protect national security.”

This ensures failure. There are similar holes in the ODNI authorizing legislation (section 10.18) and like directives. We continue to grant authorities to Agencies that thwart the establishment of an effective national security system. An EO does not make for a “single” national security system when it allows for broadly-worded waivers. We need to eliminate waivers or we will never truly have a “single classification system.” Or much of a system at all.

And yes, the Report focused on fixing a broken national security system. Public access to government information was not addressed as part of the core issues regarding national security reform. I’m confident the “public” has many priorities that weren’t addressed in our work.

A discussion with citizens, how quaint. ;-]