In talking about foresight, I’m reminded that this is not an attribute but a process.  No one “has” foresight, we look ahead – we envision.

In turbulent times, when we’re reminded of the Black Swan effects and the connected nature of things, we tremble at our inability to predict.  Truth is, our ability to predict only occurs when the world is relatively linear and stable – that is, anomalous.  We have built up such structures and have been the primary power for nearly a generation.  We have come to believe, until recently, that the world should be predictable. 

Let me illustrate, I beg your indulgence.

You are driving along Virginia’s Blue Ridge Parkway, Skyline Drive one evening.  You have set your sights on Staunton and plan to be there within two hours.  You hum along, thinking only of the dinner and wine that await you, dimly aware of your settings. As you drive, you are so
given to boredom that you have music to occupy your senses as you keep an even course.  Even if you experience a flat tire, you have preparations for that.  It’s the furthest thing from your mind, but the occurrence is normal enough that you have a jack and a spare.  If the spare is flat, well, you have AAA and a cell phone.  You aren’t thinking of this future, however, your mind is fixed on the evening’s upcoming Pinot Noir.

Then the tire blows.  And your daughter borrowed the jack.  Your phone has no coverage in this spot.  How big a spot, you don’t know. But now new possible futures are flooding your mind.  Someone may come by, you picture that scenario and how it would play out.  Even patting your pocket to ensure you have cash to compensate the Good Samaritan.

But no one comes.  You aren’t aware, but a freak rockslide closed the highway 45 minutes ago.  A Black Swan event, although there have been signs warning of such things on this road for years.  You are alone. You decide to walk to see if the cell coverage improves. Walking along the dark road, hugging the shoulder in case a car comes along, as night falls hard.

Unlike an hour ago, you are now much more aware of sounds.  Is that an animal?  If so, you try to guess its size and intent.  You are now
picturing personal futures that were completely unthinkable when you started your car this afternoon.  What if you trip and end up in a
ravine?

Does it hurt to die of exposure?

Then it begins to rain.

We can paint a similar picture, but this time by hearing a noise in your home at night.  Animal? Fallen object?  Intruder?  We flash to
several possible immediate futures, none of which were envisioned minutes earlier.

Implications for Policy Planning – Learn from Biology

What is common here?  We enter a period of heightened awareness as we simultaneously try to comprehend the changes in our environment and walk through possible futures.  This process cycles, as “new” futures enter our thoughts and obsolete ones are discarded.

These illustrations are my attempt to convey the following.  When we find ourselves off course:

1. We become more attuned to our environment
2. We focus mental energies as our bodies increase our capacity. ”From deep within your brain, a chemical signal speeds stress hormones through the bloodstream, priming your body to be alert and ready to escape danger. Concentration becomes more focused, reaction time faster, and strength and agility increase. When the stressful situation ends, hormonal signals switch off the stress response and the body returns to normal.” (NIH)
3. We model possible futures, thinking through steps and working out actions we may take.  (I’ll need a weapon if it’s an intruder.  I left a knife on the counter.”
4. We explore/probe the environment. (“I’ll walk just a little further in this direction, maybe the coverage comes back.”  ”I’ll open the door now, make some noise.”)
5. Based on what we experience next, we return to step 2 until we have a path that appears to resolve matters to our satisfaction (our perception of “satisfaction” changes as the crisis deepens).

In the current global climate, therefore, foresight and policy should become more fluid and iterative.  Adopt the mindset that this is a process, not a state.  As Eisenhower warned, “Plans are nothing, planning is everything.”

• Establish mechanisms to listen
• Focus our energies on learning interdependencies, weak links
• Cooperate more, trust more, with allies and the indifferent. We need others more than we realize, for the weak signals in the environment may be discernible to them.
• Establish a rigor of visioning, building on futures analysis.  I found a reference online that said in 1974, the House Committee on Committees stipulated that each Committee “shall review and study on a continuing basis undertake futures research and forecasting on matters within its jurisdiction.”  If true, this is extraordinary.  And a hook by which we can begin today.
• Explore, probe, experiment.  Is today’s economic crisis the end of Bretton Woods, or Westphalia?  Or does the surge towards nationalization of banks and industry represent a resurgence of Westphalia, perhaps its last?
• Rinse and repeat.

“The [U.S. national security] system fails to know what it knows, to make sense of information and trends in order to understand an increasingly complex global environment, to make effective and informed decisions, and to learn over time what works—and what does not work.”

In a blog posted to the FAS Project on Government Secrecy, Stephen Aftergood refers to the Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) – specifically the work conducted by my team, the Knowledge Management Working Group, in the area of classification reform.  Mr. Aftergood raises some important points, and I will try to respond to them here.  

It is important to make clear that I am not speaking on behalf of the Project, but instead clarifying and discussing the analysis my team has already completed. This is my personal blog, and not sponsored or sanctioned by the Project for National Security Reform.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work, as we worked against a compressed timeline and the report would have benefited greatly from additional time and resources.  My team’s sections on knowledge management probably need more explanation than most, and I hope to expand on the ideas we put in that paper soon.  I am hopeful that through conversations such as these I can add detail – but also learn from all of you how to improve our thinking on this important topic.

From the Secrecy News blog:

“’Sharing information across organizational boundaries is difficult… [because] agency cultures discourage information sharing,’ the report states.  But this is a restatement of the problem, not an explanation of it.”

If that were all we stated in our problem statement, Mr. Aftergood would have a more valid case in finding our work shallow.  In addition to his reference regarding impediments to information sharing, however, we also discuss (pp. 331-362):

- Poor interoperability on the classified side

- Overclassification

- The proliferation of the “sensitive but unclassified” designation

- Confusing technical connections with collaboration

- Information systems are missing common data abstraction, protocols, and compatible business logic

- Inability of systems to understand business limitations and context of data

The recommendations we make in the report on this topic are likewise truncated in Mr. Aftergood’s treatment.

“And so the real upshot of the report’s argument is that the classification system cannot be fixed at all, at least not in isolation or on its own existing terms. ..

They vaguely advocate a “common [government-wide] approach for information classification [that] will increase transparency, improve accessibility, and reinforce the overall notion that personnel in the national security system are stewards of the nation’s information, not owners thereof.”

We didn’t intent to be vague, and apologize if the reader is left believing that we believed that the “teams” recommendation was sufficient to resolve classification issues.  In fact, we recommend (p.450) the establishment of an Office for Decision Support within the NSC Executive Secretariat, which would include the functions within ODNI (Special Security Center)  that are currently working to establish a common security classification across the national security system.  We believe the work this office is already doing is valuable, and seek to give it budgetary and enforcement mechanisms to ensure they succeed.  From our recommendations:

“[T]he Special Security Center within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence currently works to establish uniformity and reciprocity across the intelligence community, but this approach should be expanded to include the entire national security system.”

Mr. Aftergood is correct that we believe a systemic approach to resolving the problems of the national security system  is appropriate.  Hence, while we recommend the above for classification issues, we recognize that without the reforms mentioned in the human capital, strategy, and resources sections – the ‘knowledge management’ problems will not be resolved.  

For example, the fact that information security professionals are free to assert controls that hamper information sharing and other business functions remains a problem.

“There is often a tension between information security and operational effectiveness. The latter is enabled by easy access to information and the free flow of information both within and across organizational boundaries. The former often requires tight controls on information access and sharing based on a wide range of parameters (e.g., classification level, organizational affiliation, ‘need to know’ requirements, etc.) in order to minimize risks such as unauthorized access to data, data theft, and data manipulation. Historically, national security organizations have placed more emphasis on information security requirements than on the imperatives of information access and sharing. The result has been a culture of ‘risk avoidance’ that has limited the ability of key people and organizations to work collaboratively.”

I appreciate the discussion and review of our work; which we view as the beginning of a conversation.  My thanks to Mr. Aftergood for engaging with us.